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I. INTRODUCTION
The fundamental disagreement over energy market regulation is a result
of the tension between the desire to promote free markets and the reality
that electricity is different than other goods or services. In the opening
comments of the Public Utilities Commission of Nevada’s (PUCN) report
on the Energy Choice Initiative, former PUCN Chairman Reynolds captured
this essential conflict:
The idea of choice and open markets is as quintessentially American as apple
pie, baseball, and jazz music . . . . But ensuring a non-stop supply of electricity
to every home, business, and government entity in Nevada every second of
every day of the year, regardless of the weather or economy, makes it unique
from other goods and services.1

Because electricity is a unique resource, the regulatory system has
traditionally favored the vertically integrated monopoly structure. Chairman
Reynolds succinctly captured the tension between the ideals of free market
economics and the constraints of providing reliable electricity.
Historically, policymakers at the state and federal level have attempted
to balance these ideas. The concept of “Energy Choice” and increased
interest in the deregulation of the retail electricity market raise new legal
and policy issues to consider. This Article will discuss two of the legal issues:
(1) whether the Supreme Court should eliminate the extraterritoriality
doctrine of the Dormant Commerce Clause in favor of the Pike balancing
test, and (2) whether dual sovereignty or concurrent federalism would better
serve the regulation of electricity markets. The Nevada Energy Choice
1. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N OF NEV., ENERGY CHOICE INITIATIVE FINAL DRAFT REP.,
INVESTIGATORY DOCKET NO. 17-10001, at 1 (Apr. 18, 2018) [hereinafter FINAL DRAFT
REP].
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Initiative put these legal and policy issues into context because it forced
the state’s regulators to consider the benefits and risks of a deregulated
electricity market. The Energy Choice Initiative was ultimately defeated
in Nevada; however, the debate over energy deregulation continues today
as other states consider deregulation.
The fight over “Energy Choice” or “retail electricity market deregulation”
in Nevada demonstrated a disagreement about how to structure electricity
markets, economic consequences in the billions of dollars, and thorny
legal doctrines like the Dormant Commerce Clause and dual sovereignty.
The Energy Choice Initiative was the first attempt to deregulate a state’s
retail electricity market by ballot initiative and the first include a right to
“Energy Choice.”2 The Energy Choice Initiative is one example of the
growing interest in retail customer choice or “Energy Choice” across the
country. In the past two years, Virginia and Arizona considered retail
customer choice and the deregulation of their electricity markets.3 This
Article will discuss Nevada’s novel constitutional amendment, the Energy
Choice Initiative, that proposed to deregulate Nevada’s energy market and
the legal and policy implications of the contemporary electricity deregulation
movement in the United States. Specifically, this Article will explore the
ramifications of deregulation on the extraterritoriality of the Dormant
Commerce Clause and energy federalism.
First, this Article will discuss Nevada’s response to the two most recent
attempts to deregulate their retail electricity market. The first attempt
occurred in the 1990s as a component of the broader deregulation movement
going on at that time through bills passed by the Nevada State Legislature
that were then repealed by the Governor. The second attempt began in
2016 where the Energy Choice Initiative ballot was rejected by Nevadans
in 2018.4 Additionally, this Article examines the relevant case law regarding
the duties of the Federal government, the ability of the states to regulate
2. Id. at 26.
3. Kim Riley, Virginia to Consider Controversial Deregulation Proposal Again
in 2021, DAILY ENERGY INSIDER (Nov. 24, 2021), https://dailyenergyinsider.com/news/
24300-virginia-to-consider-controversial-deregulation-proposal-again-in-2021/ [https://perma.
cc:/D6LV-JVBA]; Iulia Gheorghiu, Bipartisan bill aims to end Dominion’s Monopoly in
Virginia, UTILITY DIVE (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/bipartisan-billaims-to-end-dominions-distribution-monopoly-in-virginia/569977/ [https://perma.cc:/PJ8SK2BH].
4. 2018 Petitions and General Election Ballot Questions, NEV. SEC. OF STATE, https://
www.nvsos.gov/sos/elections/initiatives-referendums/2018-petitions [https://perma.cc:/
LYU2-3TYG].
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their energy markets, and the considerations that policymakers should
understand when considering energy market restructuring. Finally, an analysis
of the potential benefits and risks of energy deregulation is included to
exemplify the differences between state and federal jurisdiction.
To resolve federalism energy disputes over jurisdiction the courts should
recognize that: (1) the extraterritorial doctrine of the commerce clause is
outdated and inappropriate, and (2) concurrent jurisdiction better serves
the modern energy market than the traditional doctrine of dual sovereignty.
First, this comment will join the chorus of scholars and judges who seek
to eliminate the extraterritoriality doctrine in favor of the Pike balancing
test. Second, Part VI(A) argues that the resolution of energy federalism
disputes requires the flexible mindset of “cooperative federalism.” The
Pike balancing test and “cooperative federalism” would both support the
ability of states to experiment while increasing federal oversight. The
elimination of the extraterritoriality doctrine of the commerce clause could
allow for state innovation. Similarly, concurrent jurisdiction would enable
cooperative federalism that would expand, or contract jurisdiction based
on factual and pragmatic considerations.5 In conclusion, the analysis of
energy market regulation in Nevada and the United States will demonstrate
that the future of energy federalism is dependent upon the court’s commerce
clause jurisprudence and the balance of state and federal power.
II. ELECTRICITY MARKET REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
The jurisdiction of electricity markets in the United States can be characterized
as concurrent regulation by both federal and state Government with duties
distinct for each level of government. In general, the federal government
regulates wholesale energy markets and the states regulated retail markets.
The electric industry is commonly divided into four categories: generation,
transmission, distribution, and customer service. Traditionally, a vertically
integrated electric company incorporated all four of these components.
First, a utility would generate the electricity by building a power plant or
purchasing energy from the wholesale market. Second, a utility would
transmit the electricity by constructing transformers to step the voltage up
for transmission and transmission lines to carry the electricity long distances.
Third, the utility would distribute the electricity with a neighborhood
transformer to step down the voltage and neighborhood lines that ultimately
lead to the customer’s home. Finally, the utility would handle the customer
service and billing components of providing electric service.

5.
(2016).
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This traditional model persists to this day in many states; however,
advancements in technology, Supreme Court case law, and regulatory
orders have moved the United States away from the traditional model of
utility regulation towards a “deregulated” electricity market structure. The
four core aspects of providing electric service (generation, transmission,
distribution, and customer service) are now often provided by market participants
other than the investor-owned utility. As a result, the electricity markets
of the United States have become a patchwork of “deregulated” and
“traditional” electricity markets.
A. The Traditional Model of Electricity Market Regulation
The electricity market has fundamentally changed since the early Twentieth
Century, however, many of the legal concepts are relevant today. In
Bonbright’s influential paper, he observed that because of “its inherent
technical characteristics,” an electric public utility could not “be operated
with efficiency and economy, unless it enjoys a monopoly of its market.”6
In the Supreme Court case, Hope, the Court found that every State’s
public utility commission must achieve fairness and reasonableness in
addressing the concerns of both the public and the utility.7 Thus, the vertically
integrated or public utility model is subject to the “just and reasonable
rates” doctrine, which requires the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) and state public utilities commissions to ensure that rates are just
and reasonable for all customers. In Otter Tail, the Supreme Court held
that monopoly power cannot be used to destroy competition in violation
of Clause § 2 of the Sherman Act.8 “Otter Tail’s theory collided with the
Sherman Act as it sought to substitute for competition anticompetitive
uses of its dominant economic power.”9 The traditional vertically integrated
monopoly system persisted until the Federal Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA).10

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

JAMES C. BONBRIGHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES, 383–84 (1988).
Federal Power Commission v. Hope National Gas Company, 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United State, 410 U.S. 366, 380 (1973).
Id.
KENNY GUINN CENTER FOR POLICY PRIORITIES, RESTRUCTURING THE ELECTRICITY
MARKET IN NEVADA? POSSIBILITIES, PROSPECTS, AND PITFALLS 13 n.i (2018) [hereinafter
GUINN CENTER].
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B. State Jurisdiction: Electricity Market Regulation in Nevada
Nevada regulates electricity markets, like most other states, using the
traditional model of electricity regulation. The PUCN and the Attorney
General’s Bureau of Consumer Protection are the primary agencies
involved with the regulation of electricity in Nevada.11 The PUCN was
first established as the Railroad Commission of Nevada in 190812 to regulate
the railroad industry. Since the inception of the PUCN, the goal has been
to respond to the needs of a rapidly developing industry and to protect the
consumer. The same goals exist for contemporary regulation of the
electricity and telecommunications industry. Accordingly, the primary duty
of the PUCN is to set rates.
This regulatory authority is vested in the PUCN through the Nevada
State Legislature and can be traced to the Nevada State Constitution.13 The
basic statutory duties of the PUCN set forth in state statute include: (1)
providing for the fair and impartial regulation of public utilities; (2) providing
for the safe, economic, efficient, prudent and reliable operation and service
of public utilities; and (3) balancing the interests of customers and shareholders
of public utilities by providing public utilities with the opportunity to earn
a fair return on their investments while providing customers with just and
reasonable rates.14 The most essential duty is the power to establish rates.15
As a result, “[e]very cent of the monthly utility bills received by most
Nevada residents and businesses is scrutinized by the PUCN to ensure it
is fair and reasonable.”16 This takes place through the PUCN investigatory
process that often involves extensive comment and investigation as seen
in the Energy Choice Initiative investigatory docket.17 The PUCN exercises
the typical powers of the state regulatory agency charged with the regulation
of electricity; however, this traditional allocation of authority has been
challenged by changes in technology and the deregulation of electricity
markets.

11. FINAL DRAFT REP., supra note 1, at 61.
12. FIRST ANNUAL REP. OF THE RAILROAD COMM’N OF NEV. 4 (Gazette Publ’g Co.,
Apr. 10, 1908).
13. See id. at 583 (“The authorities of this and other jurisdictions are uniform in
holding that the power to regulate and establish rates which a [utility] may lawfully charge
for its service, is a legislative power.”).
14. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 703.310, 703.373, 704.120, 704.001, 703.376 (West
2021) (describing Nevada Public Utility jurisdiction over energy market regulation).
15. Degiovanni, 197 P. at 583 (“The authorities of this and other jurisdictions are
uniform in holding that the power to regulate and establish rates which a [ utility] may
lawfully charge for its services, is a legislative power.”).
16. FINAL DRAFT REP., supra note 1, at 12.
17. Id. at 21 (citing that the PUCN received “1,273 pages of questions and voluntary
comments” from the “[fifty] entities and/or persons [that] filed comments.”).
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C. The Transition Towards the Deregulation of Electricity Markets
After the energy price shocks of the 1970s and early 1980s, policymakers
began to question the efficiency of the traditional vertically integrated
monopoly system of providing energy. The Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act (PURPA) began the deregulation movement in the United
States.18 The electricity deregulation movement began with the natural gas
industry.19 This trend continued with FERC orders expanding the ability
of independent power producers to sell power on the open market.20 Case
law further allowed electricity markets to open in the United States.21 In
2008, Morgan Stanley established that the requirement for wholesaleelectricity rates to be “just and reasonable” is incapable of precise judicial
definition and FERC is afforded great deference.22 This creates a tension
between the desire to “deregulate” and promote the free market with the
requirement for electricity rates to be “just and reasonable.”
The current structure of electricity markets in the United States is a
combination of the traditional regulated utility model, the deregulated
model, and a hybrid approach. Advocates of deregulation have encouraged
FERC to be more aggressive in their promotion of electricity market
deregulation since the early 1990s. 23 However, FERC has not overtly
18. See GUINN CENTER, supra note 10.
19. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER JAMES CASTANEDA, REGULATED ENTERPRISE: NATURAL
GAS PIPELINES AND NORTHEASTERN MARKETS, https://www.google.com/books/edition/
Regulated_Enterprise/MX3Gnr5pyHoC?hl=en&gbpv=0 [https://perma.cc/UF3T-Q9E2];
R ICHARD V IETOR , E NERGY P OLICY IN AMERICA S INCE 1945: A S TUDY OF BUSINESSGOVERNMENT RELATIONS 60–70 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984).
20. See Federal Energy Guidelines: Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n Reports 18
CFR § 35.28 (1996), https://www.ferc.gov/industries-data/electric/industry-activities/open-accesstransmission-tariff-oatt-reform/history-oatt-reform/order-no-888 [https://perma.cc/ZU828CLZ]; Andy Colthorp, FERC Order 841: US About to Take ‘Most Important’ Step Towards
Clean Energy Future, ENERGY STORAGE NEWS (July 13, 2020), https://www.energy-storage.
news/news/ferc-order-841-us-about-to-take-most-important-step-towards-clean-energy-fu
[https://perma.cc/D3YN-U58R].
21. See San Diego Gas & Elec. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 904 F.2d 727
(D.C. Cir. 1990); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992).
22. Morgan Stanley Cap. Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty.,
Wash., 554 U.S. 527, 532 (2008) (hereinafter Morgan Stanley) (holding that “‘just and
reasonable’ is obviously incapable of precise judicial definition, and we afford great
deference to the Commission in its rate decisions”).
23. See generally Jess B. Kincaid, Blackouts and Oversupply or Regulatory Planning
and Cooperation, LEWIS & CLARK ENVTL L., Vol. 43, No. 3 (Summer 2013), https://www.
jstor.org/stable/43267676?mag=local-energy-deregulation-makes-climate-disasters-worse
&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents [https://perma.cc/KX9R-JAX8].
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supported the deregulation movement, despite several orders expanding
market access. For example, FERC Order No. 1000 (2015) and FERC
Order No. 890 (2007) expanded the access of independent power producers
to participate in the market of power on the open market and for customers
to procure energy outside of the traditional utility model by requiring
investor-owned utilities to open their transmission lines to competition.24
There has been a shift from investor-owned-utility (IOU) model to a
regional-transmission-operator (RTO) or independent systems operator
regulatory system (ISO).25 One sign of the growth of RTOs may be that
California passed enabling legislation that would allow the California ISO
to transform into an RTO.26 While there has been a shift towards open
energy markets, these developments run in parallel, rather than in-line, with
case law requiring rates to be just and reasonable.27
In conclusion, the different state approaches to energy policy in the
United States raise significant difficulties regarding the Dormant Commerce
Clause. The lack of direction from FERC and the continued challenges to
the IOU model of regulation, or “traditional model,” demonstrates that these
issues are persistent, and courts must consider changing their Dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence and approach to federalism to better
address these issues.
III. ELECTRICITY MARKET DEREGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Of the seventeen states that have either partially or fully deregulated their
electricity markets, none have deregulated by establishing energy policy
through a state constitutional amendment.28 A “regulated electricity market”
means that “[t]he utility company owns the infrastructure and transmission

24. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Order No. 1000 (2015); Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm’n, Order No. 890 (2007).
25. Francisco Flores-Espino, Tian Tian, Ilya Chernyakhovskiy, and Megan Mercer,
Competitive Electricity Market Regulation in the United States: A Primer, NAT’L RENEWABLE
ENERGY LAB. (2016), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy17osti/67106.pdf [https://perma.cc/4E4DMPJK].
26. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 352, 359.5, 365.2, 399.4.
27. See generally Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n,
577 U.S. 260 (2016); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Southern Calif. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205
(1964); FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271 (1976); San Diego Gas & Electric v. Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 904 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Union P. R.R. v. Adams, 362
P.2d 450, (1961); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U.S. 332
(1956); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992).
28. Deregulated Energy Markets, ELEC. CHOICE (May 5, 2021), https://www.electric
choice.com/map-deregulated-energy-markets/ [https://perma.cc/3VBY-A3D8].

242

KAUFMANN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 13: 235, 2022]

5/16/2022 1:57 PM

Nevada’s Energy Choice Initiative
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW

lines then sells it directly to the customers.”29 Benefits of this model “include
stable prices and long-term certainty.”30 In contrast, a “‘deregulated electricity
market’ allows for the entrance of competitors to buy and sell electricity
by permitting market participants to invest in power plants and transmission
lines.”31 The benefits of this model include price comparison, flexible
contracts (fixed, indexed, hybrid), and an increased availability of green
pricing programs.32 “Deregulation” does not mean that electricity will not
be regulated. As such, “deregulation” is often referred to as “restructuring”
and this Article will use both terms interchangeably. As will be shown
below, the United States remains divided on whether to establish “deregulated
electricity markets” or “regulated electricity markets.”
A. The Patchwork of Hybrid, Traditional, and Deregulated Markets
It would be futile to attempt to compare the “deregulated” states that
have decided to deregulate or restructure their electricity markets with
states operating under a traditional, regulated electricity market. Research
institutions, including the Energy Information Administration (EIA), and
public utility commissions across the nation have cautioned against using
these “apples to oranges” comparisons to make determinations about
electricity markets.33 A fundamental fact of deregulation is that no state
has an energy market that is completely deregulated.34 The closest state is
Texas with “approximately eighty-five percent of the state having access
to Energy Choice.”35 “Everything is bigger in Texas, including the success
of deregulated energy” according to Rhythm Ops, LLC, a retail electricity
provider in Texas.36 Furthermore, there is substantial variation among the
different electricity market structures whether the state has a deregulated,
29. Regulated vs. Deregulated Electricity Markets, E NERGY WATCH INC. (May
2021), https://energywatch-inc.com/regulated-vs-deregulated-electricity-markets/ [https://perma.cc/
EL2W-2MPD].
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. GUINN CENTER, supra note 10, at iii.
34. Ed Hirs, Why the Texas Power Market Failed, YALE INSIGHT (Mar. 23, 2021),
https://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/why-the-texas-power-market-failed [https://perma.cc/
45LK-AFQM].
35. Deregulated Energy Markets, supra note 28.
36. Rhythm Team, Electricity Deregulation in Texas, RHYTHM (July 9, 2021), https://
www.gotrhythm.com/blog/rhythm-news/electricity-deregulation-in-texas [https://perma.cc/
UD6R-8FU2].
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regulated, or a hybrid model of regulation. Texas demonstrates their fierce
independent spirit in their electricity with their unique system. “The Electric
Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) market presents an especially
interesting case for study and a baseline for comparison given its wide
regard as the most successful retail market in North America.”37 However,
that presumption may have come under serious question after the energy
crisis in Texas.38
Instead of attempting to describe the vast options of electricity market
structures, this section discusses how states exercise their autonomy in
determining which structure they utilize. Despite the extensive federal
involvement in federal energy markets, due to commerce clause concerns,
states exercise a significant amount of autonomy when determining how
to structure their retail residential electricity markets.
IV. ATTEMPTS TO DEREGULATE NEVADA’S WHOLESALE
ELECTRICITY MARKET
The development of electricity market regulation in Nevada from the
1990s to the present day exemplifies the Dormant Commerce Clause and
federalism issues raised by deregulation. Specifically, a constitutional
right to “Energy Choice” could violate the extraterritoriality doctrine
of the Dormant Commerce Clause. Furthermore, the balance of state and
federal power is complicated by states like Texas that chose to deregulate
their electricity markets.
A. The First Attempt: The Deregulation Movement of the 1990s
During the 1990s, many states, including Nevada, considered or completed
a restructuring of their electricity markets. In 1995, the first attempt to
deregulate Nevada’s electricity market was met with opposition due to
concerns about the California energy crisis.39 “The Nevada Legislature
passed a law in 1997 (AB 366) that directed the state to open its energy
market. However, this ultimately would not come to fruition.”40 As Nevada
37. Adam Swadley and Mine Yücel, Did Residential Electricity Rates Fall After
Retail Competition? A Dynamic Panel Analysis, FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALL. (May 2011),
https://www.dallasfed.org/-/media/documents/research/papers/2011/wp1105.pdf [https://
perma.cc/X9Y5-WZQC].
38. Robin Lloyd, Massive Power Failure Could Finally Cause Texas to Connect with
the Nation’s Power Grid, SCI. AM. (Feb. 19, 2021), https://www.scientificamerican.com/
article/massive-power-failure-could-finally-cause-texas-to-connect-with-the-nationspower-grids1/ [https://perma.cc/U2BT-ADVX].
39. See FINAL DRAFT REP., supra note 1.
40. SB547: A History of NRS 704B and Energy Deregulation in Nevada, Senator
Chris Brooks, Nevada District 3 at 4, https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/NELIS/REL/80th
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watched the Western Energy Crisis unfold, the risks of blackouts and cost
increases were cited as key reasons the proposal did not go forward.41 As
a result, in 2001, Nevada passed Assembly Bill 369 and Assembly Bill
661 to retain their regulated utility structure and “to protect Nevada’s
economy and ratepayers.”42 In support of the 2001 legislation, former
Nevada Governor Kenny Guinn said, “[w]atching our neighbors next door
[in California], I [cannot] in good faith let [energy deregulation] continue
to happen.” 43 Electricity market deregulation would not be considered
seriously by policymakers in Nevada until the proposed amendment to
Nevada’s constitution in 2016, the Energy Choice Initiative.44 Although
Nevada did not transition to a deregulated energy market, policymakers
in Nevada implemented laws to provide Energy Choice for commercial
customers,45 retail net-metering programs,46 and rural electric cooperatives.47
B. The Second Attempt: The Energy Choice Initiative
The 2016 Energy Choice Initiative proposal to voters was an attempt to
revive the deregulation proposal of the late 1990s. The desire to deregulate
had persisted since the 1990s but this was the first attempt to determine
energy policy with an amendment to a state constitution. The PUCN found
that the Energy Choice Initiative was unique “because it will amend and
add new provisions to the Nevada State Constitution that have never existed
in any other state’s constitution in the United States.”48 In a report to the
Nevada State Legislature, Nevada State Senator Brooks stated that “[The
Energy Choice Initiative] passed in 2016, but failed by a decisive margin
[sixty-seven percent to thirty-three percent] in 2018. Nevadans were
concerned about emulating the mistakes that California and Nevada made
2019/ExhibitDocument/OpenExhibitDocument?exhibitId=43883&fileDownloadName=
0523SB547a_BroC%20Presentation.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WCB-2CL4].
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 5.
44. NEVADA SECRETARY OF STATE, Statewide Ballot Questions: To Appear on the
November 8, 2016 General Election Ballot at 42, https://www.nvsos.gov/sos/home/show
document?id=4434 [https://perma.cc/274J-3DJB].
45. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 704B.080 (2019) (defining “Eligible customer”).
46. Nev. Assemb. B. 405 (2017) (establishing net metering rate structure for customers
that have purchased a solar system to offset their monthly bill).
47. About Us, VALLEY ELEC. ASS’N, https://vea.coop/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/
NV7A-VEDY].
48. FINAL DRAFT REP, supra note 1, at 26.
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in the late 1990’s.”49 Nevada’s Energy Choice Initiative failed in 2018 for
the same reason deregulation failed the first time.
The Energy Choice Initiative would have added 453 words to the text
of the Constitution of the State of Nevada.50 “To place this into perspective,
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution consists of only
[forty-five] words.”51 The text of the Energy Choice Initiative (Ballot Question
Three) proposed that Article I of the Constitution of the State of Nevada
be amended to add the following language:
1. Declaration of Policy
The people of the State of Nevada declare that it is the policy of this State that
electricity markets be open and competitive so that all electricity customers are
afforded meaningful choices among different providers, and that economic and
regulatory burdens be minimized in order to promote competition and choices in
the electric energy market. This Act shall be liberally construed to achieve this
purpose.
2. Rights of Electric Energy
Effective upon the dates set forth in subsection 3, every person, business, association
of persons or businesses, state agency, political subdivision of the State of
Nevada, or any other entity in Nevada has the right to choose the provider of
its electric utility service, including but not limited to, selecting providers from
a competitive retail electric market, or by producing electricity for themselves or
in association with others, and shall not be forced to purchase energy from one
provider. Nothing herein shall be construed as limiting such persons’ or entities’
rights to sell, trade or otherwise dispose of electricity.
3. Implementation
(a) Not later than July 1, 2023, the Legislature shall provide by law for provisions
consistent with this Act to establish an open, competitive retail electric energy
market, to ensure that protections are established that entitle customers to
safe, reliable, and competitively priced electricity, including, but not limited
to, provisions that reduce costs to customers, protect against service
disconnections and unfair practices, and prohibit the grant of monopolies and
exclusive franchises for the generation of electricity. The Legislature need not
provide for the deregulation of transmission or distribution of electricity in
Order to establish a competitive market consistent with this Act.
(b) Upon enactment of any law by the Legislature pursuant to this Act before
July 1, 2023, and not later than that date, any laws, regulations, regulatory orders
or other provisions which conflict with this Act will be void. However, the

49. Senator Chris Brooks, SB547: A History of NRS 704B and Energy Deregulation
in Nevada, https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/NELIS/REL/80th2019/ExhibitDocument/Open
ExhibitDocument?exhibitId=43883&fileDownloadName=0523SB547a_BroC%20Prese
ntation.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KJR-2WS7].
50. FINAL DRAFT REP, supra note 1, at 26.
51. Id.
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Legislature may enact legislation consistent with this act that provides for an
open electric energy market in part or in whole before July 1, 2023.
(c) Nothing herein shall be construed to invalidate Nevada’s public policies on
renewable energy, energy efficiency and environmental protection or limit
the Legislature’s ability to impose such policies on participants in a competitive
electricity market.
4. Severability
Should any part of this Act he declared invalid, or the application thereof to any
person, thing or is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect the remaining
provisions or application of this Act which can be given effect without the invalid
provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this Act are declared to
be severable. This subsection shall be construed broadly to preserve and effectuate the
declared purpose of this Act.52

According to the PUCN report on the Energy Choice Initiative and the
opponents of the Energy Choice Initiative, Section Two of the constitutional
amendment appeared to create at least two new state constitutional rights
for Nevadans. However, the proponents of the Energy Choice Initiative
argued that it did not.53 The first apparent constitutional right is the right
of every Nevadan “to choose the provider of its electric utility service. . . .”54
This right is qualified by the phrase in Section One that requires “meaningful
choice.” “Plainly understood, this new ‘right to choose’ being granted to
Nevadans cannot be a superficial or a technical choice—it has to be
one of meaning and substance.”55 The second constitutional right is the
right “to sell, trade or otherwise dispose of electricity.”56 No other state
contains a constitution with provisions related to the right to energy, and
there is no case law that dictates what it means to have a constitutional right
to energy. “Arguably, this second right reasonably creates a new constitutional
right in Nevada to sell, trade or otherwise dispose of electricity generated
from coal-fired power plants, nuclear fission, or even something a ‘backyard
inventor’ may create on his or her own.”57 That argument is difficult to
square with the contention of Energy Choice Initiative advocates that the
proposal would increase renewable energy development and procurement. The
Supreme Court has long held that certain constitutional rights are fundamental
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 27–28 (emphasis added by the PUCN report on the Energy Choice Initiative).
Id. at 32.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id.
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and personal in nature. 58 The Energy Choice Proposal would have
elevated “the importance of buying and selling electricity to the level of
those other sacred rights that define us as Nevadans and, of course,
Americans.”59
The creation of the constitutional right to “Energy Choice” would have
created legal ambiguities and complications due to the Dormant Commerce
Clause. Ultimately, the PUCN investigation found:
A disconnect appears between the plain language of the Energy Choice Initiative,
how it has been advertised, and what facts and reasoned analysis show on the
record. Legal ambiguity will be resolved by the Nevada Supreme Court and/or a
federal court. It is difficult to understand exactly what it means and its full scope
with confidence. Or to reconcile what voters may have intended or expected when
they voted to approve it.60

If the Energy Choice Initiative had passed in Nevada, the ambiguity of
this novel constitutional amendment would have been resolved by the courts.
In 2020, the Florida Supreme Court encountered a similar amendment that
proposed to deregulate their electricity market. 61 The Florida Justices
unanimously rejected the measure finding that “[t]he ballot title and summary
mislead the voter by implying that investor-owned utility customers will still
have all the consumer protections they have under current law, when, in
fact, the proposed amendment will strip away existing consumer protections.”62
The constitutional right to “Energy Choice” is novel and has been viewed
with skepticism by most of the courts that have encountered it.
V. THE BENEFITS OF DEREGULATION
The cornerstone of the argument for “Energy Choice” or the “deregulation”
of retail electricity markets is that free markets will lower rates, create
jobs, and increase the use of renewable energy. Advocates of energy market
deregulation argue that deregulation will lower rates and promote the
development of renewable energy. This section will briefly discuss the
arguments used by the deregulation movement to further exemplify the

58. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 647 (2015) (holding that “[t]he
right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person”).
59. FINAL DRAFT REP., supra note 1, at 29.
60. Id. at 25.
61. See Lawrence Mower, Florida Supreme Court rejects ‘Energy Choice’ idea, TAMPA
BAY TIMES (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2020/01/09/
florida-supreme-court-rejects-energy-choice-idea/ [https://perma.cc/SJ6C-LJ7A].
62. Keith C. Hetrick et al., Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General Re: Right to
Competitive Energy Market for Customers of Investor-Owned Utilities; Allowing Energy
Choice, (FIS) at 13 (Apr. 18, 2019), https://efactssc-public.flcourts.org/casedocuments/
2019/328/2019-328_brief_133065_initial20brief2dmerits.pdf [https://perma.cc/FU4A-MSJM].

248

KAUFMANN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 13: 235, 2022]

5/16/2022 1:57 PM

Nevada’s Energy Choice Initiative
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW

Dormant Commerce Clause and federalism considerations that are raised
by these proposals.
A. Deregulation Will Benefit All Classes of Ratepayers, Eventually
The chief argument for Energy Choice is the classic idea that free markets
promote innovation and competition, which spurs lower prices for consumers.
Proponents argue that competition could spur lower prices in the long run
if widespread deregulation occurred with encouragement by FERC. 63
While FERC has allowed electricity markets to open for additional competition,
this has been a gradual process largely regarding concerns about the
reasonability of rates.64 However, there is a substantial amount of research
that suggests that “[t]he effect of moving to a competitive retail electricity
market is mixed across states, but generally appears to lower prices in states
with high participation and raise prices in states that have little customer
participation.”65 The most ardent advocates of deregulation believe that
federally orchestrated restructuring would create a more competitive, efficient
industry.66 The aforementioned FERC orders have opened up the energy
market to independent suppliers to compete side by side with utility companies.67
Advocates of rapid deregulation argue that the current piecemeal approach to
deregulation may lead to risks for consumers and the economy.
In Nevada, there was substantial disagreement among the parties about
whether deregulation would result in lower rates for retail customers. Texas
was often used as an example during the investigation into the Energy
Choice Initiative. Then Texas Governor George W. Bush famously said,
“[c]ompetition in the electric industry will benefit Texans by reducing
63. Mine Yücel & Adam Swadley, Did Residential Electricity Rates Fall After Retail
Competition? A Dynamic Panel Analysis 15–16 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Dall., Working Paper
No. 1105, 2011), https://www.dallasfed.org/~/media/documents/research/papers/2011/
wp1105.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8F8-PZCQ].
64. See Morgan Stanley Cap. Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 547
(noting that “[m]arkets are not perfect, and one of the reasons that parties enter into wholesalepower contracts is precisely to hedge against the volatility that market imperfections
produce.”).
65. Yucel & Swadley, supra note 63, at 4.
66. Peter Navarro, Electric Utilities: The Argument for Radical Deregulation,
HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1996. https://hbr.org/1996/01/electric-utilities-the-argumentfor-radical-deregulation [https://perma.cc/J83C-99RF].
67. F ED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM ’N, ORDER NO. 636, P IPELINE S ERVICE
OBLIGATIONS (1992); FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, ORDER NO. 436, REGULATION
OF NATURAL GAS PIPELINES AFTER PARTIAL WELLHEAD DECONTROL (1985).
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monthly rates.”68 For the first few years, that seemed to be true for Texas.
However, analysis by the Wall Street Journal found that, “From 2004
through 2019, the annual rate for electricity from Texas’s traditional utilities
was [eight percent] lower, on average, than the nationwide average rate,
while the rates of retail providers averaged [thirteen percent] higher than
the nationwide rate.”69 In summary, the difficulty of performing economic
analysis makes prediction about retail rates unreliable.
B. Deregulation Promotes the Development of Renewable Energy
Advocates of Energy Choice and deregulation argue that the opening of
markets will spur technological development and competition which will
increase renewables.70 The cheap cost of renewable energy has prompted
some to argue that the deregulation of electricity markets will increase the
availability of renewables, because a free market will seek the cheapest
option.71 Deregulation may promote the development of renewable energy
by allowing customers to choose energy suppliers that use renewable
energy. In a regulated market, consumers must purchase electricity from
their local utility at prices regulated by the state and federal governments.
In a deregulated market, consumers can choose from a variety of electricity
service providers based on their particular needs. For example, in Texas,
Gexa Energy offers plans that use 100% renewable energy.72 In summary,
the opening of markets to competition and the ability for customers to
choose green electricity providers indicate that deregulation could help
promote the development of renewable energy.
C. The Argument for Deregulation in Nevada
The advocates of the Energy Choice Initiative ranked their priorities
when drafting the ballot measure as follows: (1) choice, (2) renewables, and

68. Tom McGinty & Scott Patterson, Texas Electric Bills Were $28 Billion Higher
Under Deregulation, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2021, l, https://www.wsj.com/articles/texaselectric-bills-were-28-billion-higher-under-deregulation-11614162780 [https://perma.cc/
XW29-24YR].
69. Id.
70. Navarro, supra note 66.
71. Vote Yes on Question 3 for Energy Choice in Nevada, ELEC. CHOICE, https://
www.electricchoice.com/blog/vote-yes-choice-nevada/ [https://perma.cc/KNN2-RK6G].
72. Dave Kovaleski, Gexa Energy in Texas offers 100 percent renewable energy to
customers, DAILY ENERGY INSIDER (Nov. 24, 2020), https://dailyenergyinsider.com/news/
28116-gexa-energy-in-texas-offers-100-percent-renewable-energy-to-customers/#:~:text
=RenewableSourceState-,Gexa%20Energy%20in%20Texas%20offers%20100%20percent
%20renewable%20energy%20to,to%20100%20percent%20renewable%20energy [https://
perma.cc/RD6C-HNCT].
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(3) jobs.73 The first goal of Energy Choice was designed to enable consumers
of all rate classes to have “meaningful choices.” 74 During the PUCN
investigation, the stakeholders agreed that this was the essential part of
the proposal. The second goal was to promote renewables by “opening up
the market to companies that provide clean energy.”75 The advocates of
Energy Choice estimated that the Energy Choice Initiative would have
created 34,000 new jobs in the state.76 The proponents further claimed that
the Energy Choice Initiative would have reduced electric bills for residential
retail customers.77 Despite these supposed benefits, Nevada voters determined
that the risks of deregulation outweighed the benefits when they rejected
the initiative at the ballot box.
VI. THE RISKS OF DEREGULATION
A. Deregulation May Disproportionality Benefit Certain
Classes of Ratepayers
The complexity of restructuring and the unique characteristics of each
state’s energy system make it impossible to accurately predict the costs or
benefits of deregulation for a particular state. Several reports have found
that it is difficult to determine the impact to ratepayers because restructuring
has occurred differently in each state.78 The primary source of data is from
the U.S. EIA. However, by their own admission, the EIA data should not
be used for these sorts of comparisons, given the various factors that
determine electricity rates (such as weather and other economic shocks)
that are difficult to predict.79 To attempt to account for these variations,
this section will focus on Nevada once again.

73. FINAL DRAFT REP., supra note 1, at 25.
74. Id. at 24.
75. Vote Yes on Question 3 for Energy Choice in Nevada, supra note 71.
76. Id.
77. See Riley Snyder, Indy Fact Check: Claims of lower electric rates from energy
choice backers need significant context, THE NEVADA INDEPENDENT (Aug. 19, 2018, 2:05
AM), https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/indy-fact-check-claims-of-lower-electricrates-from-energy-choice-backers-need-significant-context [https://perma.cc/62TC-88G5].
Advocates of the ballot question have been quick to point out individual success stories for
certain states that have move to a retail market.
78. GUINN CENTER, supra note 10, at iii (quoting EIA reports that caution against
“apples to oranges” comparisons).
79. Id. at ii-iii.
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In Nevada, it was unclear whether the proposed Energy Choice Initiative
would have reduced rates for all classes of customers. The PUCN undertook
a study of the Energy Choice Initiative and produced the “Draft Report of
Findings on the Energy Choice Initiative” with the intent to create “an
objective resource to help educate all Nevadans, so that informed decisions
are made regarding Nevada’s energy future.”80 The PUCN investigation
into the Energy Choice Initiative conducted workshops and hearings over
a year period. 81 The hearings attracted attention from energy lawyers,
policymakers, and advocates from across the country. When PUCN
Chairman Reynolds asked the proponents of Energy Choice if they could
assure him that restructuring would reduce costs for customers, they could
not.
CHAIRMAN REYNOLDS: . . . “[I]s there anybody here [in Carson City]
in participation who would want to go on the record and guarantee that this
petition will lower rates for the average residential families, if passed? Who
can give that assurance?
(No Response)
CHAIRMAN REYNOLDS: Is there anyone in Las Vegas who would want
to go on the record and give that assurance that this petition will lower rates
for residential families?
(No Response)
CHAIRMAN REYNOLDS: And I want to just point out that nobody is
coming up to the microphone.82

The complexity of electricity makes it difficult, if not impossible, for
the advocates of Energy Choice to establish that deregulation will lower
prices for retail customers. In Nevada, it was clear that deregulation would
benefit large commercial customers like casino moguls, such as Sheldon
Adelson, who helped fund the proposal.83 Deregulation may benefit the
economy as a whole; however, those benefits will likely be realized at
different times, and the benefits to commercial and retail customers would
be disproportionate. In conclusion, for Nevada, there is evidence that
deregulation may not decrease the electricity rates for residential consumers.

80. FINAL DRAFT REP., supra note 1, at 1.
81. Id. at 22.
82. Id. at 25.
83. Riley Snyder, How Energy Choice, the Most Expensive Ballot Question in Nevada
History, Went from a Slam Dunk to an Airball, THE NEV. INDEP., https://thenevadaindependent.
com/article/how-energy-choice-went-from-a-slam-dunk-to-an-airball, (“Republican Party
megadonor Sheldon Adelson contributed half a million dollars to the nascent Energy
Choice Initiative.”).
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B. Deregulation May Not Promote Renewable Energy Development
As stated previously, many of the proponents of Energy Choice and
deregulation argued that open energy markets promote renewable resources.
In contrast, the critics argue deregulation could compromise state efforts
to promote renewable energy. First, deregulation could limit the ability of
states to administer residential net-metering programs. Second, the increase
in renewable energy development could be attributed to Renewable Portfolio
Standards, rather than the deregulation of electricity markets.
Residential net-metering programs are popular among ratepayers and
seen by many states as a valuable public policy program to promote renewable
energy. States should be aware that these programs are substantially more
difficult to administer in a deregulated retail electricity market.84 For
a more thorough discussion of the potential effects that restructuring may
have on net-metering programs and rooftop residential solar deployment,
see Enhanced Western Grid Integration: A Legal and Policy Analysis of
the Effects on California’s Clean Energy Laws.85 For the purposes of this
comment, it is sufficient to state that a potential drawback of electricity
market deregulation is the impact to residential net-metering programs.
There is disagreement over whether electricity deregulation influences
the development of renewable energy or whether those increases are due
to the aggressive Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS standards) enacted
by several states that have also undergone restructuring. These skeptics
attribute the increase in renewable energy in deregulated states to the RPS
standards enacted during the same time that many states began restructuring.86
For example, one study attributed the increases in renewable energy
development to state RPS standards, rather than the impact of free markets
and increased regulation.87 As mentioned, the advocates of Energy Choice
in Nevada maintained that the development of renewable energy was a
key goal of the proposal. The logic is, given the low cost of renewable energy
sources on the market today, consumers will gravitate towards the cheapest
energy resources, which will spur competition and lower prices for renewable

84. See Juliana Brint et al., Enhanced Western Grid Integration: A Legal and Policy
Analysis of the Effects on California’s Clean Energy Laws, YALE ENVTL PROT. CLINIC,
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/clinic/document/yaleepc_enhanced_western_
grid_integration_may_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2JW-L6ZK].
85. GUINN CENTER, supra note 10, at 26.
86. Id. at 51.
87. Id. at 50.
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energy. The Yale Environmental Protection Clinic’s study found that the
expansion of the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) into a
regional system operator across several states would not make the transition
to renewable energy more likely to succeed. Their “analysis indicate[d]
that the expansion of CAISO into a regional system operator across several
states would not make these challenges any more likely to succeed.” 88
This economic analysis is outside the scope of this comment; however,
the disagreement about whether deregulation increases renewable energy
development is noteworthy.
C. Deregulation May Raise Reliability Issues
One issue raised by participants in the PUCN study on the Energy
Choice Initiative was reliability. Reliability refers to the ability to provide
consistent, reliable energy to all customers year-round. Reliability is defined
“as the degree to which the performance of the elements in a bulk system
results in electricity being delivered to customers within accepted standards
and in the amount desired.”89 A potential risk of the deregulated model is
assigning the “provider of last resort” or POLR.
“An electric provider of last resort (or POLR) is an entity that provides
electric service to customers who, for one reason or another, are unable to
receive electric service from a competitive supplier.”90 “[W]ithout a regulated
utility, Nevada would have to determine how to establish or select an
entity to provide this service without creating a monopoly or exclusive
franchise for generation.”91 If the utility is required to divest their generation
assets, then who will take over as this provider of last resort? In Nevada,
this question went unanswered.
In other states, the provider of last resort (POLR) has also been an issue.
In Texas, Warren Buffet offered to supply Texas emergency power for
eight billion dollars.92 “If approved, the deal would signal a move away
from decades of a competitive electricity market in Texas.”93 Elon Musk

88.
89.

Brint et al., supra note 84, at 3.
JOHN D. KUECK ET AL., MEASUREMENT PRACTICES FOR RELIABILITY AND POWER
QUALITY, A TOOLKIT OF RELIABILITY MEASUREMENT PRACTICES 3 (U.S. Dep’t of Energy
June 2004), https://info.ornl.gov/sites/publications/Files/Pub57467.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3M2E-ZBFX].
90. FINAL DRAFT REP., supra note 1, at 89.
91. Id. at 91.
92. Cassandra Pollock and Erin Douglas, Warren Buffett group lobbying Texas
lawmakers for deal to build $8 billion worth of power plants for emergency use, TEX. TRIB.
(Mar. 25, 2021), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/03/25/warren-buffett-texas-power-plants/
[https://perma.cc/2UJP-9F3B].
93. Id.
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also offered to sell power to Texas. 94 Given the multitude of factors that
contribute to blackouts and reliability issues, it is impossible to determine
whether deregulation increases or decreases reliability issues in Texas and
elsewhere. It is certain that changes to the electricity structure have unintended
consequences, as evidenced by the California Energy Crisis of the 1990s
and the Texas Energy Crisis.95 Deregulation does not necessarily lead to
issues with reliability or the designation of the provider of last resort;
however, these issues must be considered in the context of the Dormant
Commerce Clause and distribution of jurisdiction. As will be discussed
later, concurrent jurisdiction could better allow the state and federal
government to balance the power between federal and state regulators to
address these reliability issues better.
D. The Impact of Deregulation on Residential Retail Electricity Rates
FERC and state regulators must consider the potential impact deregulation
can have on residential consumers rates. When electricity markets fail to
provide the public with reasonable rates, the effects can be devastating. In
Texas, the PUC mandated that the $9,000 prices stay in effect for thirtytwo hours after the market had returned to normal.96 An egregious example
of unreasonable rates due to predatory retail electricity providers occurred
in Massachusetts during the natural gas crisis. “The average price of natural
gas . . . reached a record high . . . [thirty-four percent] higher than the previous
record” and “[t]he average price of electricity also reached a record high . . .
[forty-six percent] higher than the previous high.”97 These consumers were

94. Jason Plautz, Tesla Plan to Sell Electricity in Texas Would Cut Out the ‘Middleman’,
UTIL. DIVE, (Sept. 1, 2021), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/tesla-plan-to-sell-electricityin-texas-would-cut-out-the-middleman/605899/ [https://perma.cc/8RCV-8WYM].
95. PAUL J. JOSKOW, CALIFORNIA’S ELECTRICITY CRISIS, OXFORD REV. OF ECON.
POLICY, (vol. 17 no. 3 2011), http://economics.mit.edu/files/1149 [https://perma.cc/CF3N46MJ]; Dan Esposito & Eric Gimon, The Texas Big Freeze: How Much Were Markets to
Blame for Widespread Outages?, UTIL. DIVE (June 3, 2021), https://www.utilitydive.
com/news/the-texas-big-freeze-how-much-were-markets-to-blame-for-widespread-outages/
601158/ [https://perma.cc/PH9A-RSCD].
96. Loren Steffy, In Private, a Top Regulator Pledged He Would Try to Protect
Profits Made During the Blackouts, TEX. MONTHLY (Mar. 16, 2021), https://www.texasmonthly.
com/news-politics/wall-street-profited-off-texas-blackouts/ [https://perma.cc/TC3W-KXHG].
97. William Pentland, New England’s Energy Crisis and the Case Against ‘OneOf-The-Above’ Energy Policies, F ORBES (Mar. 5, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
williampentland/2014/03/05/new-englands-energy-crisis-and-the-case-against-one-of-theabove-energy-policies/?sh=5a8a2c47645c [https://perma.cc/7X8Q-RWTC].
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exposed to these increased prices only if they had entered into the “deregulated”
electricity market by opting into an electricity service program based on
the cost of natural gas. The U.S. Energy Information System found that
this risk persists “[a]bsent infrastructure changes that significantly increase
the capacity of natural gas suppliers to meet peak winter loads in the region.”98
The combination of a polar vortex and an increase in gas prices is not the
only risk consumers face.
If consumers can choose an electricity plan based on the price of electricity,
they could expose themselves to price shocks. The energy crisis that Texas
experienced this year is another example of a polar vortex causing massive
price spikes and shortages in energy.99 The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) analysis indicates that with the global increase in
emissions and global temperatures there is a need to invest in “reliable
technologies” and “state-of-the-art-electricity grid.”100 State Public Utility
Commissions and FERC must resolve these disasters while gingerly stepping
around to avoid jurisdictional issues.
Ultimately, deregulation invites Dormant Commerce Clause and federalism
issues because these jurisdictional boundaries are blurred by a deregulated
retail electricity market. The deregulation of electricity markets created
layers of conflicting jurisdiction and increased the complexity of the
electricity market regulation. When a crisis occurs, as seen in Texas or the
Northeast, where do those jurisdictional boundaries lay between the state
and federal government? This is an impossible question to answer given
the different layers of jurisdiction. The modern electricity market is incompatible
with the extraterritoriality doctrine of the Dormant Commerce Clause and
strict adherence to dual sovereignty.
VII. THE FUTURE OF ELECTRICITY MARKET REGULATION
IN THE UNITED STATES
To reconcile the issues raised by deregulation, scholars and courts should
consider eliminating the extraterritoriality doctrine of the commerce clause
and whether concurrent federalism would better balance the different
layers of state and federal jurisdiction. This section poses two questions:
(1) whether the extraterritoriality doctrine of the Dormant Commerce
98. Id.
99. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, NERC to investigate mass outages a cross
ERCOT,SPP, MISO, UTIL. DIVE, https://www.utilitydive.com/news/ferc-nerc-to-investigatemass-outages-across-ercot-spp-miso/595173/ [https://perma.cc/UFP8-3GR5].
100. Dr. Hoesung Lee, Chair of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
and Dr. Fatih Birol, Executive Director of the International Energy Agency, Energy is at
the heart of the solution to the climate challenge, IPCC, July 31, 2020, https://www.ipcc.ch/
2020/07/31/energy-climatechallenge/ [https://perma.cc/AN2M-92KS].
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Clause should be retained in its current form, eliminated, or modified; and
(2) whether concurrent federalism is a viable alternative to dual sovereignty.
First, courts should eliminate the extraterritoriality doctrine of the Dormant
Commerce Clause to allow more flexibility for state innovation. However,
there are drawbacks to the expansion of the Pike test to consider. Second,
concurrent jurisdiction presents a viable option to replace the dual sovereignty.
The overlapping jurisdiction of the state and the federal government over
electricity markets would be better served by a more flexible version of
federalism that would be adjusted based on factual and pragmatic considerations.
In summary, the complexity of electricity market regulation and “deregulation”
in the United States cannot be resolved by outmoded Dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence or rigid notions of federalism.
A. The Extraterritoriality Doctrine of the Dormant Commerce Clause
The combination of state and federal regulation of electricity markets
further constrains a court’s ability to apply the Dormant Commerce Clause.
The Dormant Commerce Clause “prohibits state taxation or regulation that
discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce and thereby
impedes free private trade in the national marketplace.”101 Meanwhile,
states “retain authority under their general police power to regulate matters of
legitimate local concern, even though interstate commerce may be affected.”102
A branch of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the extraterritoriality doctrine,
stands for the proposition that state statutes that regulate behavior outside
of that state’s borders will be invalidated.103 Modern Dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence has shrunk the sphere of state regulation.104 To illustrate
these tensions, this section begins with the Dormant Commerce Clause issues
raised by Nevada’s Energy Choice Initiative. Depending on how “Energy
Choice” is implemented, there is a risk that a court would find that it was
invalid because it regulated behavior “wholly outside” of their state. Another
example of this tension is whether states have the ability of states to implement
renewable portfolio standards or other environmental regulations. This section

101. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997).
102. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980).
103. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989).
104. See Tessa Gellerson, Extraterritoriality and the Electric Grid: North Dakota v.
Heydinger, A Case Study for State Energy Regulation, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 563, 564,
565 (2017).
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will explain two alternatives to contemporary Dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.
When the Nevada policymakers and the PUCN evaluated the constitutional
idea of “Energy Choice,” one of the first issues that came to mind was the
Dormant Commerce Clause. The PUCN noted that any modification of a
state’s electricity market regulation may invite claims of Dormant Commerce
Clause violations.105 Nevada’s Energy Choice Initiative was particularly
creative with their attempt to deregulate electricity markets in Nevada by
choosing to use a constitutional amendment. As of today, no other state
has attempted to deregulate their electricity market through a constitutional
amendment for “Energy Choice.” An “Energy Choice” constitutional
amendment to implement the “deregulation” of the energy market would
be difficult for courts and public utilities to implement because the action
invites legal ambiguity. The addition of a new constitutional right that
entitles all consumers to “Energy Choice” is a novel concept that likely would
have been challenged.106 A challenge to “Energy Choice” would have been
based on the Dormant Commerce Clause.
The first alternative to contemporary Dormant Commerce jurisprudence
would be to eliminate the extraterritoriality doctrine and fold that into the
Pike balancing test.107 This would place extraterritoriality within a balancing
framework to better consider the validity of state statutes. Pike established
that state laws that “regulat[e] even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest . . . will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”108
“Scholars have written extraterritoriality’s obituary and extraterritoriality
has been termed the ‘most dormant’ clause of the Dormant Commerce
Clause.”109 The question is whether “the extraterritoriality doctrine, at least
as a freestanding branch of the Dormant Commerce Clause, is a relic of
the old world with no useful role to play in the new?”110 This question has
evoked criticism about its application and whether it has kept pace with
modern society.

105. F INAL DRAFT REP., supra note 1, at 36 (“Proponents of the Energy Choice
Initiative recognize that it may raise Dormant Commerce Clause issues, but believe it also
leaves ‘a lot of room’ for Nevada to regulate.”).
106. Id. at 31 (“Nevertheless, the existence of these conflicts and ambiguities must
be recognized because they are likely sources of future litigation involving the Energy
Choice Initiative.”).
107. See Gellerson, supra note 104, at 566.
108. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970); see also South Dakota
v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2091 (2018).
109. Gellerson, supra note 104, at 566.
110. Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 735 F.3d 362, 378 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J.,
concurring).
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First, the extraterritoriality doctrine may be problematic for being overinclusive. In Healy, Justice Scalia noted that there are “innumerable valid
state laws” that affect out-of-state behavior.111 “[I]f any state regulat[ion]
that ‘control[s] . . . conduct’ out of state is per say unconstitutional, wouldn’t
we have to strike down state health and safety regulations that require outof-state manufacturers to alter their designs or labels?”112 If extraterritoriality
were recast as part of the Pike balancing test, it could provide a way forward
for innovative state legislation while also granting courts sufficient leeway to
strike down state legislation that is overly burdensome to interstate commerce.113
In summary, some scholars suggest folding the extraterritoriality analysis
into the Pike balancing test.
On the other hand, those critical of folding extraterritoriality into the
Pike balancing test, such as Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, argue that
this complicates the “totality of the circumstances” approach.114 “[Balancing]
invites us, if not compels us, to function more as legislators than as
judges.”115 Justice Scalia noted that under Pike, courts must ask “whether
a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”116 Justice Scalia
voiced a similar criticism about concurrent federalism because it would
allow a balancing test in lieu of the traditional “bright line” rule. While
these critics raise valid points about the risks of these more expansive tests
balancing tests, it is evident that the traditional extraterritoriality doctrine
has struggled to effectively balance state and federal concerns.

111. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 345 (1989).
112. Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1175 (10th Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 595 (2015).
113. See Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution,
50 ARIZ. L. REV. 879, 889 (2008) (arguing that in the environmental context, extraterritorial
impacts should be considered as part of the Pike balancing test rather than as part of a per
se rule).
114. See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 359–61 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
619 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[Balancing] invites us, if not compels us, to function
more as legislators than as judges.”); Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enter., Inc., 486
U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that under Pike, courts
must ask “whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy”).
115. Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 360–61 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
619 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
116. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia,
J., concurring in judgment).
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In conclusion, it is unclear whether the extraterritoriality doctrine should
be taken out to pasture or whether courts should take a nuanced approach.
Further research should attempt to resolve which approach is better. The
patchwork of electricity market regulation in the United States demonstrates
that the Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence should evolve to match
the reality of electricity markets in the United States today. Energy and
environmental practitioners should be aware that there are arguments to
move away from the status quo of Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence
in energy and environmental law.
B. The Future of Energy Federalism: Concurrent Jurisdiction
vs. Dual Sovereignty
The founding fathers debated the balance of state and federal power
in rooms illuminated by oil lamps with no conception of electricity as a
commodity and the issues it would raise for federalism. Today, electricity
is a commodity bought, sold, and traded in an international market that is
subject to dramatic price fluctuations from day to day. The electricity
market is heavily regulated by local, state, national, and international
regulations. Electricity has become essential to modern society, yet it
remains vulnerable to dramatic price fluctuations, temperature variations,
network congestions, and market manipulation. Concurrent jurisdiction
would better address the complexity of modern-day electricity markets
than dual sovereignty.
The uncertainty regarding the direction FERC seeks to take regarding
deregulation makes it difficult for States to determine whether to structure
their state as a regulated or deregulated energy market.117 The primary role
of the state, since the advent of electricity, has been to regulate retail rates
and customers within their state. The Federal Power Act established federal
preemption over the wholesale electricity market. As discussed previously,
this federal preemption has been scaled back since the 1990s and has
allowed the states more leeway with regulation. Some research argues that
states should exert more control over their electricity markets to retain
autonomy over their policy goals, such as the transition to clean energy.118
The lack of direction from Congress or the Federal Government makes it
difficult to determine the effect the deregulation movement will have on
117. John S. Moot, A Modest Proposal for Reforms of the FERC’s Reliability and
Enforcement Programs, 33 ENERGY L.J. 475, 488 (2012), https://www.eba-net.org/assets/
1/6/17-475-Moot[Final11.9].pdf [https://perma.cc/4TJ2-VZSR].
118. See Gavin Bade, Electricity Markets: States Reassert Authority Over Power
Generation, UTIL. DIVE (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/electricitymarkets-states-reassert-authority-over-power-generation/539658/ [https://perma.cc/ZPW5PW4S].
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energy markets. There may be risks to slowing down this deregulation
trend, and this piecemeal approach to deregulation could pose a threat for
consumers.119 The electricity crisis in Texas has demonstrated that the
structure of retail electricity markets can have serious impacts on energy
reliability. This uncertainty may necessitate a more flexible approach to
federalism.
Concurrent federalism, a more accommodating version of federalism
than dual sovereignty, could better allocate the jurisdiction over electricity
markets. Over the past eighty years, the courts have fixated on dual sovereignty
as the paradigm for the power granted to FERC and state Public Utilities.120
Rossi argues in his paper, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, that
these doctrines must be cleared to effectively navigate modern energy markets.121
He explains that the traditional allocation of authority was a jurisdictional
“bright line” defining distinct spheres of exclusive authority.122 For many
decades, this dual sovereignty coexisted peacefully.123 Then, the Texas energy
crisis demonstrated the ways in which these conflicting jurisdictional powers
can be at odds. In contrast to the “bright line,” concurrent jurisdiction could
better advance the purpose of federal energy regulations.124 Concurrent
jurisdiction offers a compelling alternative to the traditional bright line rule
that limits the flexibility of the courts to consider the allocation of jurisdiction.
Concurrent federalism does, however, have critics and chief among
them is Justice Scalia. In ONEOK, Justice Scalia vigorously dissented
from this approach claiming that the majority’s shift towards concurrent
jurisdiction makes a “snarl” out of the Court’s precedents.125 In Justice
Scalia’s last published opinion, he took issue with concurrent jurisdiction
stating, “I cannot imagine a more irrational interpretive principle than the
119. Jess B. Kincaid, Blackouts and Oversupply or Regulatory Planning and
Cooperation, 43 ENV’T. L. REV. 671, 673 (2013), https://www.jstor.org/stable/43267676 [https://
perma.cc/EL24-AQG9] (“The complexity of the existing piecemeal U.S. system of
jurisdiction over electricity production and transmission makes it difficult to perform
comprehensive regulatory planning” and “the cost of violating transmission contracts will
be passed on to consumers.”).
120. Rossi, supra note 5, at 400–01.
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., FPC v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215 (1964); see also
Robert R. Nordhaus, The Hazy “Bright Line”: Defining Federal and State Regulation of
Today’s Electric Grid, 36 ENERGY L.J. 203, 206 (2015).
123. Rossi, supra note 5.
124. Id. at 405.
125. Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1603, 1606 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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following, upon which the majority evidently relies.”126 Despite the hesitation
of critics like Justice Scalia, it is clear that federal authority is not exclusive
and it supports state experimentation in many instances.127 For example,
states retain the ability to adopt incentives for clean-energy resources under
Hughes Talen.128 While concurrent federalism may be an option, the
critics have a valid point that this goes against the precedent of dual
sovereignty.
If federalism must move away from the traditional “bright line” rule,
the courts should be cautious before embracing concurrent federalism. At
times, this “bright line” rule allows for efficiency and the ability to define
the spheres of influence. On the other hand, the “bright line” can constrain
state innovation and competition. Today, the electric-power sector continues
to evolve, and notions of federalism should evolve with it by continuing
to move away from bright line rules. It is unclear whether concurrent
federalism is a viable alternative, however, and courts and scholars should
give more consideration to novel approaches to energy federalism.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The debate about the structure of retail electricity markets demonstrates
that policymakers and voters must carefully consider the benefits and risks
of a “regulated” or “deregulated” electricity market. The courts will continue
to grapple with: (1) whether the Supreme Court should eliminate the
extraterritoriality doctrine of the Dormant Commerce Clause in favor
of the Pike balancing test, and (2) whether dual sovereignty or concurrent
federalism would better serve the regulation of electricity markets.
The public utility commissions began as agencies overseeing railroads
and evolved into one of the most complex state agencies in existence. The
courts may soon consider whether a deregulated retail electricity market
or a state environmental regulation runs afoul of the Dormant Commerce
Clause or the separation of powers doctrine. In the meantime, the Dormant
Commerce Clause and common conceptions of federalism must evolve as
to sew together the patchwork quilt of each state’s approach to energy
regulation.

126. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct.
760, 787–88 (2016) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127. See Rossi, supra note 5.
128. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1297 (2016) (striking
down Maryland’s program to incentivize investments in natural-gas plants on the grounds
that it “invades FERC’s regulatory turf” by “adjusting an interstate wholesale rate”); id. at
1299 (distinguishing Maryland’s program from other state programs which encourage
“production of new or clean generation through measures ‘untethered to a generator’s
wholesale market participation’”).
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